

ACTION  
COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01  
ACTION L-03

BUENOS 02761 090248Z

2314

BUENOS 02761 090248Z

INFO OCT-01 ARS-15 ADS-00 MCT-02 SY-05 EB-03 GSA-02  
ICA-20 CIAE-00 IUN-10 NSAE-00 EUR-12 /078 W  
-----123782 090833Z /17

R 062016Z APR 79  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0181  
USDOC JTBKNC

UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 2761

COUNTRY LAWS ON TERRORISM: UPDATE

REF: STATE 69183

1. POST DOES NOT HAVE COPY OF RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT AIRGRAM CITED REFTEL. NONETHELESS, MANY LAWS ON TERRORISM HAVE BEEN AMENDED SINCE 1974, A RESULT OF THE HIGH LEVEL OF TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA THROUGH 1977 ARGENTINA IS NOT A PARTY TO THE NEW YORK OR OAS CONVENTIONS. WHILE LAWS 19,793 AND 20,411 RATIFY THE HAGUE AND MONTREAL CONVENTIONS RESPECTIVELY, THERE HAVE BEEN NO IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS TO THESE LAWS.

2. THE BASIC LAW ON TERRORISM IS LAW 20,840 ENACTED ON SEP 28, 1974 WHICH WAS AMENDED BY LAW 21,459 OF NOVEMBER 18, 1976. ARTICLE 1 OF THE CURRENT LAW MANDATES A PRISON SENTENCE OF BETWEEN THREE AND EIGHT YEARS FOR THOSE WHO USE NON-CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS TO DISTURB THE ARGENTINE INTERNAL ORDER FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS, UNLESS THE OFFENSE COMES UNDER ANOTHER PROVISION OF EXISTING LAWS WITH STIFFER PENALTIES. ARTICLE 2 DECREES PRISON TERMS FROM TWO TO SIX YEARS FOR THOSE WHO TEACH OR SUPPORT OTHERS WHO CARRY OUT SUBVERSIVE ACTS. ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 3, THOSE WHO USE SYMBOLS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR RADIO OR NEWSPAPERS AUTHORITIES WHO PUBLICIZE THEIR STATEMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO TWO TO FIVE YEARS IMPRISONMENT. IF ANY OF THESE OFFENSES ARE COMMITTED BY NATURALIZED ARGENTINES, AFTER SERVICING THEIR SENTENCE, THEIR CITIZENSHIP IS REVOKED AND THEY ARE EXPELLED FROM THE COUNTRY. FOREIGNERS COMMITTING THESE CRIMES ARE EXPELLED FROM ARGENTINA FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF THEIR SENTENCE. UNDER LAW 21,450, ALSO ENACTED ON NOV 18, 1976, THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES AS WELL AS THE POLICE ARE GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY TO PROSECUTE TERRORISTS.

3. IN ADDITION TO THESE LAWS DEALING WITH IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORIST ACTS, ARTICLE 210 OF THE ARGENTINE PENAL CODE STIPULATES A SENTENCE OF FIVE TO FIFTEEN YEARS FOR THOSE BELONGING TO AN ORGANIZED GROUP WHICH COMMITS VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST A PERSON OR INSTITUTION. UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE SAME ARTICLE, LEADERS OF SUCH ARMED GROUPS ARE SUBJECT TO IMPRISONMENT OF BETWEEN EIGHT AND TWENTY FIVE YEARS. IF THEIR ACT LEADS TO LOSS OF LIFE OR GRAVE WOUNDS SUSTAINED BY THEIR VICTIMS, THE ARTICLE STATES THAT THE PUNISHMENT SHALL BE DEATH OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT RESPECTIVELY. THE SENTENCE OF THOSE WHO VOLUNTARILY GIVE THEMSELVES UP IS REDUCED TO FIFTEEN TO TWENTY FIVE YEARS, TEN TO TWENTY YEARS, OR BY A THIRD FOR SENTENCES OF DEATH, LIFE IMPRISONMENT, OR A REDUCED PRISON TERM RESPECTIVELY.

4. ARTICLE 170 OF THE PENAL CODE MANDATES A FIVE TO FIFTEEN YEAR PRISON TERM FOR PERPETRATORS OF KIDNAPPING ATTEMPTS MADE FOR RANSOM AND AN EIGHT TO FIFTEEN YEAR TERM IF THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL. UNDER ARTICLE 142, KIDNAPPERS ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO AN EIGHT TO TWENTY FIVE YEAR PRISON TERM IF THE VICTIM IS WOUNDED IN THE ACT OR IF FORCED TO GIVE

AID TO A SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION. IN CASE THE VICTIM DIES IN CAPTIVITY, THE OFFENDER IS SUBJECT TO THE DEATH SENTENCE. ARTICLE 225 DECREES A TWO TO SIX YEAR PRISON SENTENCES FOR THOSE WHO PAY RANSOM TO KIDNAPPERS OR ECONOMICALLY AID TERRORISTS.  
CASTRO

LEGAL ADVISER  
APR 9 1979  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

8940

PAGE 01 BUENOS 02198 202036Z  
ACTION MCT-02

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ISO-00 SY-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02  
SS-15 ICA-11 IO-14 HA-05 /091 W  
-----114958 210355Z /61

R 201930Z MAR 79  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9902

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 2198

E.O. 12065 GDS 3-29-85 (THAYER, YVONNE) OR-P  
TAGS ASEC, PORG, PINS, PINR, AR  
SUBJECT (U) ARGENTINE CONSIDERATION OF CRIMES AGAINST DIPLOMATS

REF: A STATE 045016; B STATE 057380; C BUENOS AIRES 1272

1. ~~RE-ENTIRE~~ TEXT)

2. EMBASSY CONVEYED CONTENTS OF REFTELS A AND B TO APPROPRIATE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS, LEAVING BEHIND DETAILED AIDE MEMOIRES. IN REPLY TO SUBJECT RAISED IN REFTEL A, GOA ORALLY AND INFORMALLY AGREED TO PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH US OFFICIALS IN THE EVENT OF THREATS OR DANGER TO THE LIVES OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL.

3. ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION (REFTEL B), A MINISTRY OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGED ARGENTINA'S FAILURE TO RATIFY AS SAID THAT RATIFICATION IS AGAIN UNDER CONSIDERATION AS RESULT OF THE EMBASSY DEMARCHE. THE OFFICIAL CITED NO SPECIFIC ARGENTINE OBJECTION TO THE CONVENTION (UNLIKE ANOTHER MINISTRY OFFICIAL'S EARLIER EXPLANATION OF ARGENTINA'S OPPOSITION TO THE OAS CONVENTION ON TERRORISM AS REPORTED IN REFTEL C), ALTHOUGH HE NOTED THAT THE INFORMAL AGREEMENT TO PRIOR CONSULTATION AND THE EXISTING BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATY FULLY COVERED ANY CRIMINAL ACT AGAINST US DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS. HE PROMISED TO ADVISE EMBASSY WHAT IF ANY ACTION GOA PLANS TO TAKE ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION.  
CASTRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BUENOS 01272 160108Z POSS DUPE  
ACTION ARA-15

954

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 MCT-02 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02  
SS-15 ICA-11 HA-05 /090 W

-----064978 170531Z /15

R 151401Z FEB 79  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9504  
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN  
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO  
AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 1272

E.O. 12065 GDS 2-14-85 (THAYER, YVONNE) OR-P  
TAGS PORG, PINS, OAS, AR  
SUBJECT (U) ARGENTINA OPPOSED TO SCOPE OF OAS CONVENTION ON TERRORISM

REF: STATE 020764

1. (U) ARGENTINA OPPOSED THE OAS CONVENTION ON TERRORISM IN 1977 AS INADEQUATE AND TOO NARROW A MEASURE TO TREAT EFFECTIVELY WITH TERRORIST THREATS AND HAS NO INTENTION OF SIGNING OR PARTICIPATING IN THE CONVENTION, ACCORDING TO FOREIGN MINISTRY CHIEF OF OAS AFFAIRS ADEN. ADEN SAID ARGENTINA WITHDREW FROM THE CONFERENCE ON THE ISSUE IN PROTEST THAT THE CONVENTION ONLY DEALT WITH TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST DIPLOMATS AND IGNORED THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF TERRORISM. (EMBASSY DOES NOT HAVE TEXT OF TREATY TO VERIFY ADEN'S EXPLANATION.) ADEN CLAIMED THAT ARGENTINA'S POSITION IS GAINING GROUND, HOWEVER, CITING THE 1977 OASGA IN GRENADA WHEN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RECOMMENDED ANOTHER, BROADER LOOK BE TAKEN AT THE WHOLE QUESTION OF TERRORISM AND AN EFFECTIVE REGIONAL RESPONSE. AT THAT TIME, THE MATTER WAS RECOMMENDED TO THE OAS PERMANENT COUNCIL FOR FURTHER STUDY, THE RESULTS OF WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN REPORTED OUT, SAID ADEN.

2. (U) COMMENT. ARGENTINA IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ON THE WHOLE QUESTION OF TERRORISM, BELIEVING ITSELF AND UNWITTING VICTIM OF AN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM CONSPIRACY. ARGENTINA HAS BROUGHT UP THE MENACE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN NUMEROUS MULTILATERAL FORA, SEEKING SYMPATHY FOR ITS OWN CASE AS WELL AS AN INSTITUTIONALIZED RESPONSE TO TERRORISM. THE COUNTRY'S REJECTION OF THE REFERENCED CONVENTION THEREFORE APPEARS TO BE NOT SO MUCH OPPOSITION TO ITS INTENT AS TO ITS NARROW SCOPE. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT ARGENTINA WILL CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE A BROADER LOOK AT THE WHOLE QUESTION OF TERRORISM, BUT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID LINKAGE TO HUMAN RIGHTS, WHERE ARGENTINA HAS A WELL PUBLICIZED RECORD. ITS STRATEGY MAY BE TO PUSH COUNTRIES WITH BETTER HUMAN RIGHTS REPUTATIONS TO PROMOTE AND EXPANDED DEFINITION AND CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM IN ALL FORMS. END COMMENT.  
CASTRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BUENOS 09002 01 OF 02 132254Z  
ACTION SY-05

5718

BUENOS 09002 01 OF 02 132254Z

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ISO-08 MCT-02 CIAE-08 INR-10  
NSAE-08 PA-01 ICA-11 PM-05 L-03 SS-15 SP-02  
AID-05 EB-08 ACDA-12 COME-08 HA-05 H-01 GSA-02  
A-02 IO-14 PC-01 OPR-02 CA-01 SCS-06 /125 W  
-----120540 132314Z /70

R 132036Z NOV 78

FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8249

INFO DIA WASHDC

AMEMBASSY PANAMA

USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS CANAL ZONE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 9002

FROM RSO - DEPARTMENT FOR A/SY/FO/ARA, SY/SY/TAGS/CC, AND  
ARA/ECA; PANAMA FOR RSS; CANAL ZONE FOR SCJ-2

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ASEC, PINS, PINT, AR

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES - MONTH OF  
OCTOBER 1978

1. THIS REPORT GIVES A SUMMARY REPORT OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE  
AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO US BY  
SECURITY FORCES DURING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 1978.

2. OCTOBER 7 - A BOMB EXPLODED IN A VEHICLE (A FIAT) WHICH  
WAS PARKED IN THE WOODED AREA OF EZIEZA. THE DEVICE WAS  
DETONATED WHEN MR. JUAN JOSE CASTRO, 35 YEARS OF AGE AND  
HIS SON, PABLO CASTRO, SIX YEARS, APPROACHED THE VEHICLE  
AND MANIPULATED A PACKAGE LOCATED WITHIN THE VEHICLE.  
BOTH MR. CASTRO AND HIS SON WERE WOUNDED BY THE EXPLOSION  
AND TAKEN TO THE EZIEZA HOSPITAL. NO FURTHER INFORMATION  
WAS RECEIVED BY THIS OFFICE.

OCTOBER 10 - AT APPROXIMATELY 1 A.M. THREE ARGENTINE  
GENTLEMEN NAMED HERALDO DURANTE SCARANAL, ALEJANDRO  
DANIEL SPAJANOLLO AND MR. DARIO HECTOR GARCIA, WERE ADMITTED  
TO THE HOSPITAL POLICLINICO CENTRAL SUFFERING GUN SHOT  
WOUNDS. UPON BEING QUESTIONED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES THE  
WOUNDED MEN ADVISED THAT WHILE DRIVING THROUGH THE INTER-  
SECTION OF REPUBLICA ORIENTAL DE URUGUAY AND AVENIDA  
CROVARA IN VILLA MADERO, THEIR VEHICLE WAS FORCED TO THE  
SIDE OF THE ROAD BY A FIAT CONTAINING THREE INDIVIDUALS.  
THE THREE MEN IN THE FIAT WHICH FORCED THEM OFF THE SIDE  
OF THE ROAD, GOT OUT OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND BEGAN SHOOTING.  
THE MEN ADVISED THEY ESCAPED IN THEIR VEHICLE  
AND CAME TO THE HOSPITAL FOR TREATMENT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED  
THAT ONE OF THE OCCUPANTS MR. SPAJANOLLO IS THE SON OF AN  
ARGENTINE MAJOR AND THE NEPHEW OF THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
OF THE ARGENTINE WAR COLLEGE.

OCTOBER 11- WITHIN THE FACULTY OF ARCHITECTURE SEVERAL  
INSCRIPTIONS WERE FOUND SIGNED BY THE P.C.R. IN WHICH  
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES WERE CRITICIZED. THE INSCRIPTIONS  
READ "PATRIOTIC UNIT AGAINST THE GUERRILLA-FACIST DICTATOR-  
SHIP OF VIDELA." NEXT TO THE INSCRIPTION WAS DRAWN THE  
HAMMER AND CYCLE.

- ON THE SAME DATE AT APPROXIMATELY 1 A.M. IN THE  
MORNING, BOMB EXPLOSIVE PERSONNEL WERE SUMMONED TO AN  
INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENT LOCATED AT 2942 CANALEJAS WHERE  
A SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE WAS LOCATED. INSPECTION OF THE  
PACKAGE PROVED TO BE NEGATIVE.

- AT APPROXIMATELY 6:40 A.M. MR. CARLOS OSCAR ROLAS,  
ARGENTINE 46 YEARS OF AGE, NOTIFIED LOCAL AUTHORITIES  
THAT UPON LEAVING HIS RESIDENCE HE DISCOVERED A BOX WITH  
THE INSCRIPTION "DON'T APPROACH - EXPLOSIVES - DO NOT  
TOUCH." POLICE AND BOMB EXPLOSIVE EXPERTS ARRIVED AND  
DEACTIVATED A BOMB WHICH CONSISTED OF DYNAMITE.

OCTOBER 15 - AT APPROXIMATELY 11:15 A.M. IN THE

INTERSECTION OF DON BUSCO AND LURO STREETS MORTARS WERE  
FOUND SIZES 50 X 15 CENT. MADE OUT OF STEEL WITH THE  
INSCRIPTION "BOR 1946 NO. 6615 AND BOR 1946 NO. 54540."  
OCTOBER 17 - TERRORISTS ATTACKED IN DIFFERENT AREAS  
OF MORON BY PLACING "PAMPHLET AND MOLOTOV BOMBS" WHICH  
CAUSED MINOR MATERIAL DAMAGES. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME  
DETAILS OF THE EVENTS:

1. AT APPROXIMATELY 8:20 P.M. IT WAS REPORTED THAT AN  
EXPLOSIVE DEVICE HAD BEEN FOUND IN THE SAN MARTIN RAIL-  
ROAD STATION. THE BOMB WAS DEACTIVATED BY BOMB EXPLOSIVE  
EXPERTS WHO STATED THAT THE DEVICE WAS A PAMPHLET BOMB.

2. AT APPROXIMATELY 8:20 P.M. ON RICHIERRI AND O'BRIEN  
STREETS, THE HOME OF JORGE ARROZ HORACIO RANDLE, A  
MOLOTOV BOMB EXPLODED CAUSING A MINOR FIRE WHICH THE OWNER  
WAS ABLE TO EXTINGUISH.

3. IN THE HOME OF PABLO MURATORE, LOCATED AT 1120 GARAY  
A MOLOTOV BOMB WAS PLACED ON THE ROOF OF A FIAT 800.  
BOMB EXPLOSIVE EXPERTS WERE ABLE TO DEACTIVATE THE BOMB.

4. AT 1170 GARAY, RESIDENCE OF MR. ARMANDO CISILOTO,  
OWNER OF A WAREHOUSE, A MOLOTOV BOMB EXPLODED CAUSING  
MINOR DAMAGE TO THE FRONT DOOR.

5. IN THE HOME OF MR. ADOLFO ALFONSO MENDEZ TRONCE,  
LOCATED AT 1370 JUAN DIEZ DE SOLIS, FORMER SECRETARY OF  
THE STATE DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN THE PROVINCE OF BUENOS  
AIRES, AN INCENDIARY BOMB EXPLODED CAUSING LITTLE DAMAGE.  
TWO OTHER EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, A PAMPHLETARY AND MOLOTOV  
WERE DISCOVERED AND DEACTIVATED BY BOMB EXPLOSIVE PERSONNEL.

OCTOBER 20 - AT APPROXIMATELY 0830 A.M. IN THE MORNING  
A POLICE PATROL CAR OF THE LOMAS DE ZAMORA PRECINCT  
OBSERVED TWO SUSPICIOUS INDIVIDUALS AT THE INTERSECTIONS  
OF MONTEAGUDO AND ALVEAR. THE POLICE VEHICLE STOPPED AND  
ASKED THE INDIVIDUALS TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES. AT THIS  
POINT THE TWO INDIVIDUALS STARTED SHOOTING AND ESCAPED,  
LEAVING BEHIND ONE BRIEFCASE CONTAINING A BOX WITH 30  
CARTRIDGES OF 9MM. AMMUNITION AND AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WHICH  
WAS DEACTIVATED BY BOMB EXPLOSIVE EXPERTS.

OCTOBER 24 - AT 10 A.M. TWO UNKNOWN INDIVIDUALS FORCED  
THEIR WAY INTO A GROCERY STORE LOCATED AT 2237 SAHORES

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01

BUENOS 09002 02 OF 02 132256Z

5714

ACTION SY-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ISO-00 MCT-02 CIAE-00 INR-10  
NSAE-00 PA-01 ICA-11 PM-05 L-03 SS-15 SP-02  
AID-05 EB-08 ACDA-12 COME-00 HA-05 H-01 GSA-02  
A-02 10-14 PC-01 OPR-02 CA-01 SCS-06 /125 W  
-----120556 132314Z /70

R 132036Z NOV 78

FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8250

INFO DIA WASHDC

AMEMBASSY PANAMA

USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS CANAL ZONE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 9002

BUENOS AIRES. THE SUSPECTS THREATENED THE OWNER,  
MR. ROBERTO ANTERO AND STOLE A PISTOL FROM POLICE OFFICER  
SGT. VINCENT VICTOR ORMANO, WHO WAS IN THE STORE AT  
THE TIME OF THE ROBBERY. POLICE SGT. MANUEL ANGEL  
GUIDI WITNESSED THE EVENT AND STARTED FIRING AT THE  
CRIMINALS AS THEY ESCAPED. THE CRIMINALS RETURNED THE  
FIRE, WOUNDING SGT. GUIDI IN THE RIGHT ARM AND LEFT FOOT.

OCTOBER 25 - AT THE LOCATION OF ABRA DEL HINOJO, WHICH  
IS APPROXIMATELY 50 MS. FROM THE CITY OF PIGUE, SAAVEDRA,  
PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES, UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS  
DETONATED A POWERFUL EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WHICH WAS PLACED  
IN A PEUGOT 404. THE VEHICLE WAS TOTALLY DESTROYED.  
CASTRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BUENOS 05045 010615Z  
ACTION ARA-14

3181

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 MCT-01 HA-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02  
SS-15 ICA-11 AID-05 TRSE-00 /079 W  
-----124473 020650Z /11

R 301459Z JUN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6329

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 5045

E.O. 11652 GDS  
TAGS SHUM, AR  
SUBJECT ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS REPORTED IN LA PLATA

1. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED REPORTS FROM FOUR DIFFERENT HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCES (THREE OF WHOM ARE FROM LA PLATA) REGARDING SECURITY OPERATIONS IN LA PLATA BELIEVED TO BE DIRECTED AGAINST PERSONS WITH EITHER THE TRAINING OR THE ACCESS TO EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN USED IN THE JUNE 1 AND JUNE 14 BROADCASTS OF MONTONERO PROPAGANDA ON THE TELEVISION AUDIO FREQUENCY DURING WORLD CUP FOOTBALL MATCHES.

2. A HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCE WHO HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST GAVE THE EMBASSY THE NAMES OF SEVEN PERSONS REPORTED ABDUCTED DURING THE LA PLATA OPERATION. THIS SOURCE STATES THAT THERE HAS BEEN A LARGE NUMBER OF RAIDS AND HE HAS HEARD THAT AS MANY AS 25 PERSONS MAY HAVE BEEN PICKED UP. EMBASSY AS YET HAS NO CONFIRMATION OF THESE OPERATIONS FROM SECURITY OR DAO SOURCES.

3. THREE OF THE DISAPPEARANCES HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE LA PLATA DAILY, EL DIA.

4. THE ABDUCTION OF OSCAR ESTEBAN ANTONIO ELICABE URRIOL, AN EMPLOYEE OF A COMMUNICATIONS SUPPLY FIRM, ATTRACTED ATTENTION BECAUSE HE WAS TAKEN FROM HIS HOSPITAL BED IN EARLY JUNE. ELICABE, ACCORDING TO SOURCE AND PRESS ACCOUNTS, UNDERWENT BLADDER SURGERY ON MAY 31 AND WAS REMOVED FROM THE HOSPITAL DE AGUDOS GENERAL SAN MARTIN BY A GROUP OF ARMED MEN IDENTIFYING THEMSELVES AS MEMBERS OF THE JOINT FORCES. PRIOR TO HIS ABDUCTION, ACCORDING TO THE NEWSPAPER ACCOUNT, HIS HOME WAS SEARCHED AND BOOKS AND A TELEVISION SET REMOVED.

5. ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY SOURCES, PROVINCIAL POLICE LOCATED THE LOW POWER TRANSMITTER IN A DOWNTOWN LA PLATA HOTEL ROOM WHICH WAS USED FOR ONE OF THE ILLEGAL BROADCASTS. THE TRANSMISSION WAS VERY LOW POWERED, EXTENDING SOME FIVE BLOCKS IN RADIUS FROM THE TRANSMISSION POINT AND WAS TRIGGERED BY A TIMING MECHANISM. INTERRUPTION OF AUDIO TV SIGNAL HAS BEEN A TACTIC USED ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS BY THE MONTONEROS.  
CASTRO

*Handwritten:*  
1155  
TERRORISM -  
ARGENTINA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
*Department of State*

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BUENOS 03548 02 OF 02 091610Z

0076

BUENOS 03548 02 OF 02 091610Z

ACTION: SY-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 HA-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 HSC-05 PA-01 SP-02  
SS-15 ICA-11 COME-00 EB-08 LAB-04 SIL-01 /087 W  
-----051794 091722Z /75

R 091500Z MAY 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5643  
INFO DIA WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY PANAMA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 3548

FROM RSO TO SY AND ARA: PANAMA FOR RSS

FOUR MASTER ELECTRIC LINES WITH INTERFACE TO THE 100-LINE SYSTEM INSTALLED FOR THE WORLD CUP.

APR 22: IT WAS REPORTED THAT CGT-R HAD SENT TO SEVERAL UNIONS IN TUCUMAN AND SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO COPIES OF BULLETIN NO. 2 "RESISTANCE" OF THE CGT-R.

- ON THE SAME DATE, PERSONS BELIEVED TO BE SUBVERSIVES SHOT AT POST THREE OF THE LA PLATA MILITARY DISTRICT. NO ONE WAS INJURED AND THE ATTACKERS ESCAPED.

- IN BANFIELD, BS. AS. PROVINCE, AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DETONATED AT THE HOME OF FORMER BUENOS AIRES GOVERNOR OSCAR ALENDE, CAUSING SERIOUS DAMAGES TO THE PREMISES AND A SHOP NEXT DOOR. THERE WERE NO INJURIES.

APR 24: IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL AT CABELLO 3679, A SMALL BOMB DETONATED IN THE APT. BUILDING CAUSING MATERIAL DAMAGE AND ONE INJURY.

APR 26: AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WAS DETONATED AT THE GENERAL SAN MARTIN PROVINCIAL SCHOOL IN CORDOBA. THE BOMB CAUSED SERIOUS MATERIAL DAMAGE.

- RAUL ANTONIO AYBAR TURNED HIMSELF IN TO COMANDO FOUR IN TUCUMAN. HE BELONGED TO THE PRT-ERP.

APR 27: SEVERAL UNIONS IN CORDOBA PROVINCE RECEIVED FROM BS. AS. BULLETIN NO. 207, DATED APR 12, 1978, OF THE MARXIST-COMMUNIST-LENINIST PARTY.

APR 30: IN THE SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING, UNIVERSITY OF ROSARIO, THE NEWSPAPER "NUEVA HORA", A PCR PUBLICATION, WAS DISTRIBUTED. IT WAS DATED MARCH 25, 1978. THERE WERE ALSO BULLETINS DISTRIBUTED FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

- ON THE SAME DATE IN MENDOZA, AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WAS

DETONATED IN FRONT OF THE RESIDENCE OF CARLOS ALBERTO CURCHOD. THE BOMB WAS PLACED UNDER HIS CAR AND CAUSED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE. CURCHOD WORKS IN THE CRIMINAL COURT BUILDING AND ALSO BELONGS TO THE CIVIL INTELLIGENCE GROUP "C" OF THE AIR FORCE.

3. RSO COMMENT: DURING APRIL, RSO MET WITH MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE SECURITY SERVICES CHARGED WITH DEVELOPING INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. SOURCES STATED THE CURRENT TERRORIST STRENGTH IS 450-500 MONTONERO COMBATANTS, OF WHICH 150 ARE OUTSIDE OF ARGENTINA, AND 200-275 MEMBERS OF THE RP, OF WHOM ONLY 20 ARE CONSIDERED COMBATANTS, SUPPORTED BY A CADRE OF APPROXIMATELY 100-175 PERSONS IN ARGENTINA. BOTH ORGANIZATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE ERP, ARE WEAK AND HAVE ONLY LIMITED COMBAT CAPABILITY. HOWEVER, THE MONTONEROS CONTINUE ATTACKS ON SOFT TARGETS, INCLUDING BUSINESS PERSONNEL AND MEMBERS OF THE GOA. CASE IN POINT WAS THE ATTACK AGAINST THE HOME OF MR. DON JOHNSON, U.S. EMPLOYEE OF ALUAR, A DIVISION OF REYNOLDS ALUMINUM, ON 4-14-78. HIS RESIDENCE WAS APPARENTLY THE TARGET OF A G-40 GRENADE FIRE FROM A GRENADE LAUNCHER.

4. SOURCES STATED THE MONTONEROS, IN SPITE OF LOGISTIC WEAKNESS, STILL HAVE A SUPPLY OF THE LG 22 MP GRENADE

LAUNCHER WHICH IS A SOPHISTICATED BAZOOKA-LIKE ATTACK WEAPON AS WELL AS THE SFM G 70 A AND SFM G 40 GRENADES WHICH ARE FIRED FROM THE LAUNCHER. BOTH THESE GRENADES HAVE AN ACCURACY UP TO APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS AND WILL PENETRATE ONE-HALF INCH OF STEEL. THEY ARE USED AGAINST POLICE PRECINCTS AND MILITARY AND POLICE VEHICLES AS WELL AS OCCASIONALLY IN ATTACKS ON RESIDENCES. THE G 40 IS THE NEWEST IN THEIR SERIES OF LAUNCHED GRENADES. THEY HAVE ALSO REFINED THEIR HAND GRENADE AND DEVELOPED THE SHF G 5 WHICH CONTAINS A VERY HIGH SHRAPNEL CONTENT. UNDER DEVELOPMENT, IS THE SFM TROMBA WHICH IS A LAUNCHER USED TO CONVERT A 12 GAUGE SHOTGUN TO FIRE GRENADES AND THE SFM LGE 22 WHICH IS A SMALL MORAR ONLY IN THE DESIGN STAGE. SOURCES STATED THAT EVEN THOUGH THE MONTONEROS HAVE IN SOME AREAS IMPROVED THEIR WEAPONS, THEY ARE IN VERY LIMITED SUPPLY.

5. THEY HAVE ALSO CONTINUED THEIR DEVELOPMENT OF EXPLOSIVES AND ARE CURRENTLY USING A PLASTIQUE WHICH THEY DESIGNATE AS C2. THE MOST CURRENT EXPLOSIVE DEVICE IS NORMALLY PACKED IN A PLASTIC CYLINDER, 17 CMS HIGH AND 9 CMS IN DIAMETER. IT IS MANUFACTURED TO PRODUCE AN EXPLOSION IN ONE DIRECTION, SIMILAR TO A SHAPED CHARGE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT IT WAS DEVELOPED FOR ATTACKS AGAINST HOMES AND SHOPS WITH THE IDEA OF PRODUCING MAXIMUM DESTRUCTION IN ONE DIRECTION AND DIMINISHING EXPLOSIVE EFFECTS IN OTHER DIRECTIONS. IT IS ACTIVATED BY A TIMER SIMILAR TO THE ONE USED IN WASHING MACHINES AND IS SET NORMALLY FOR A FIVE MINUTE DELAY. THE ACTIVATING SYSTEM IS ELECTRIC AND USED A 1.5 VOLT BATTERY AND A NUMBER 8 ELECTRICAL DETONATOR OF AUSTRIAN MANUFACTURE. THE EXPLOSIVE CHARGE CONTAINS 800 GMS OF AMYNIUM ALUMINIZED POWDER. IT CAN BE MANUFACTURED WITH AMMONIUM NITRATE, POTASSIUM PERCHLORATE, RUBBER POWDER AND ALUMINUM POWDER. THE EFFECTS ARE QUITE SIMILAR TO TNT. IT ALSO CONTAINS A TRIAL CIRCUIT CHECK SYSTEM WITH A PARALLEL CIRCUIT USING A 1.5 VOLT LAMP. THE EXPLOSIVE FORCE CAN PENETRATE 60 CM. OF A MASONRY WALL OR 10 CMS OF STEEL. ACCORDING TO SECURITY SERVICES, THIS EXPLOSIVE DEVICE IS THE NEWEST IN THE TERRORIST ARSENAL OF WEAPONS. HOWEVER, IN SPITE OF IMPROVEMENT IN EXPLOSIVES, COMIGARIO MARTINI, CHIEF OF FEDERAL POLICE EXPLOSIVES BRIGADE, STATED THAT BOMB INCIDENTS ARE GREATLY RED# FROM THIS TIME LAST YEAR AND THAT SOME EXPERTS OF THE POLICE DEMOLITION UNITS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO ROUTINE INSPECTION DUTIES. SOURCE STATED HE EXPECTS THIS DOWNWARD TREND TO CONTINUE WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF JUNE 1978, DURING THE WORLD CUP. ALL OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO RSO SUPPORTS THIS VIEWPOINT.  
CASTRO

NOTE BY OCT: # AS RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BUENOS 03548 .01 OF 02 091559Z  
ACTION: SY-05

0080

BUENOS 03548 .01 OF 02 091559Z

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 HA-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02  
SS-15 ICA-11 COME-00 EB-00 LAB-04 SIL-01 /087 W  
-----051698 091723Z /75

R 091500Z MAY 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5642  
INFO DIA WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY PANAMA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 3548

FROM R30 TO SY AND ARA: PANAMA FOR R53

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, PINT, SHUM, AR  
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES  
MONTH OF APRIL 1978

1. DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN APRIL, NUMEROUS LABOR UNIONS IN THE CITY OF MAR DEL PLATA RECEIVED BULLETINS OF THE CGT-R (GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR - RESISTANCE, A MONTONERO GROUP).

2. APR 2 - IN CORDOBA, ERP INSIGNIAS WERE FOUND PAINTED ON A BRIDGE AND SOME BUILDINGS. THIS IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE ERP PRESS AND PROPAGANDA SECTION.

- ON THE SAME DAY, SOME COMMUNICATIONS CENTERS IN CORDOBA RECEIVED VIA MAIL FROM MEXICO BULLETIN NO. 5 OF THE SENIOR COUNCIL OF THE MONTONERO PERONIST MOVEMENT (MPM).  
- PAMPHLETS WERE MAILED FROM BUENOS AIRES TO VARIOUS UNIONS IN THE CITY OF CORDOBA. TITLE OF THE PAMPHLET WAS:  
FIVE YEARS OF POPULAR TRIUMPH.

APR 4: THE BODIES OF TWO TERRORISTS WERE FOUND IN A RESIDENCE IN THE RURAL AREA OF RIO TERCERO. THEY WERE IDENTIFIED AS IVAN BROLO AND CESAR ARGANARAZ. BOTH MEN HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE PRT-ERP ATTACK ON THE MILITARY FACTORY IN VILLA MARIA IN 1974.

APR 6 - IN LA PLATA, ITEMS OF TERRORIST MANUFACTURE WERE FOUND BELONGING TO THE PCML (MARXIST-LENINIST-COMMUNIST PARTY) OF THE LA PLATA REGION. MATERIALS INCLUDING EQUIPMENT TO MANUFACTURE SHOTGUN AND REVOLVER AMMUNITION.

APR 7 - PRESS AND PROPAGANDA SECTION OF THE FEDERATION JUVENILE COMUNISTA (FJC) BEGAN TO ISSUE THEIR PUBLICATION CALLED "CONCIENCIA" AND "IMAGEN", BOTH BI-WEEKLY.

- ON THE SAME DATE IN RESISTENCIA, RETIRED MAJOR ISAAC MANN RECEIVED A PAMPHLET ENTITLED "MESSAGE TO OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, NO. 2" BY THE NATIONAL STAFF OF THE MONTONERO ARMY. THE PAMPHLET WAS DATED JANUARY 1978.

APR 8 - SUBVERSIVES IN A LIGHT BLUE TRUCK OPENED FIRE ON THE TIGRE COAST GUARD BUILDING. NO ONE WAS INJURED.

APR 10 - IN SAN LUIS, LOCAL UNION HQ OF UOCRA (CONSTRUCTION WORKERS UNION) REPORTED RECEIVING MONTONERO PAMPHLETS FROM BUENOS AIRES.

APR 11 - IN SAN ISIDRO, SUBURB OF BUENOS AIRES, TWO PERSONS DRIVING A WHITE FIAT 125 SHOT DR. MIGUEL TOBIAS PADILLA, UNDERSECRETARY OF ECONOMIC PROMOTION, MINISTRY OF ECONOMY. DR. PADILLA DIED ENROUTE TO THE HOSPITAL AFTER RECEIVING 4-5 BULLET WOUNDS. NOTE: SECURITY SERVICES DO NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS A TERRORIST OPERATION.

APR 12 - MONTONERO PAMPHLET WAS MAILED FROM THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TO THE CORDOBA CHIEF OF THE CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERS BATTALION. A SIMILAR PAMPHLET WAS RECEIVED ON APR 14 IN POSADAS, ADDRESSED TO THE GOVERNOR OF MISIONES PROVINCE.

- APR 14: THE RESIDENCE OF MR. DONALD JOHNSON, U.S. EMPLOYEE OF ALUAR, DIVISION OF REYNOLDS ALUMINUM, WAS ATTACKED BY SUBVERSIVES USING A G-40 GRENADE, FIRE FROM A

GRENADE LAUNCHER. THERE WERE NO INJURIES BUT CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE WAS DONE TO THE RESIDENCE (SEE B.A. 3106 FOR MORE DETAILS).

- PAMPHLET WAS RECEIVED BY THE ASSIST. CHIEF OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS ENTITLED, "MESSAGES OF THE ARMED FORCES, NO. 2."

- ON THE SAME DATE IN SANTA FE, THE ASSOCIATION OF GOVT EMPLOYEES RECEIVED FROM PARIS A BULLETIN OF THE MONTONERO PERONIST MOVEMENT COVERING LAST AUG AND SEPT.

- ON THE SAME DATE, SEVERAL PERSONS ATTACKED FEDERAL POLICE AGENT HUGO GALEANO AND STOLE HIS BROWNING 9 MM PISTOL AND AMMUNITION. THIS OCCURRED IN BS.AS. PROVINCE.

- APR 17: IN SANTA FE, UNKNOWN SUBVERSIVES SHOT AT THE HOME OF CP. TABORDA OF THE RADIO ELECTRIC COMMAND. NO ONE WAS INJURED.

- ON THE SAME DATE, THE ASSOCIATION OF SANITARY WORKERS IN SALTA RECEIVED FROM FRANCE TWO ENVELOPES CONTAINING MPM PAMPHLETS.

APR 18: A PAMPHLET ENTITLED, "MOVEMENT NO. 5" PERTAINING TO THE MONTONEROS WAS RECEIVED BY THE ASSOCIATION FRIULANA IN CORDOBA. THE PAMPHLET HAD BEEN MAILED FROM HONDURAS.

- ON THE SAME DATE, IN LA PLATA, CHALK MARKS WERE FOUND IN THE STREETS STATING MONTONEROS WILL DEFEAT THE MILITARY.

- SEVERAL PERSONS BELIEVED TO BE SUBVERSIVES ATTACKED AND REMOVED THREE REVOLVERS FROM CORDOBA POLICE SUBCOMISARIO OSCAR CARRIZO.

APR 19: IN LA PLATA, PRISON GUARD JOSE LUIS GUILLERMO OF THE OLMOS PENITENTIARY SECURITY GUARDS WAS SHOT IN BOTH LEGS BY PERSONS BELIEVED TO BE SUBVERSIVES.

APR 21 IN QUILNES, BS.AS. PROVINCE, A POWERFUL BOMB WAS DISCOVERED IN FRONT OF A RESIDENCE BELONGING TO NAVY CHAPLAIN PEDRO FERNANDEZ.

- IN MENDOZA, PERSONS BELIEVED TO BE SUBVERSIVES CUT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BUENOS 00206 111818Z  
ACTION ARA-14

1760

BUENOS 00206 111818Z

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 MCT-01 SY-05 EB-08 COME-00 HA-05  
A-01 AID-05 TRSE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PH-05 H-01  
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02  
SS-15 USIA-06 /086 W

-----119206 120237Z /63

R 111543Z JAN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4073

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 0206

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, AR  
SUBJECT: TERRORISM

REF: (A) 77 BUENOS AIRES A-151, (B) 77 BUENOS AIRES 9764,  
(C) STATE 001340

1. OVER THE PAST YEAR THE SECURITY SITUATION IN ARGENTINA HAS GREATLY IMPROVED. THE BEST AVAILABLE ESTIMATES OF TERRORIST STRENGTH REFLECT 400-500 MONTONEROS, 700-100 ERP AND LESS THAN 20 WORKERS POWER COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION (OCPO). THE LEADERSHIP OF BOTH THE MONTONEROS AND THE ERP IS OPERATING OUT OF EUROPE AND THE ORGANIZATIONS ARE IN DISARRAY. THE OCPO HAS NOT RECENTLY ENGAGED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND FOR THE MOST PART THEY ARE IN DEEP HIDING. RECENTLY A CACHE OF ARMS WAS DISCOVERED IN MAR DEL PLATA BELONGING TO THE PCML (MARXIST LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY). HOWEVER, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FOR OVER 1 1/2 YEARS.

2. THE MONTONEROS REPRESENT THE MAJOR TERRORIST THREAT. THEY ARE OPERATING PRINCIPALLY IN THE SOUTHERN AREA OF GREATER BUENOS AIRES WHICH INCLUDES THE MAJOR INDUSTRIAL AREA. THEY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO FORGE AN IDENTIFICATION WITH DISSATISFIED WORKERS AND TO CAPITALIZE ON THE HARSH ECONOMIC SITUATION. THEY HAVE THREATENED BUSINESS EXECUTIVES WHOSE COMPANIES HAVE BECOME INVOLVED IN LABOR DISPUTES OR WHO HAVE LAID OFF WORKERS. THIS ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY STRONGLY WITH WORKERS' ASPIRATIONS THROUGH ATTACKS AGAINST MANAGEMENT IS AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE THEIR MAIN GOAL DURING THIS COMING YEAR.

3. THE MAJOR LIMITATION ON MONTONERO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES RESULTS FROM THEIR DEPLETED RESOURCES. THEY HAVE SUFFERED MAJOR DEFECTIONS, IN SOME CASES OF HIGH RANKING PERSONNEL. MANY OF THESE DEFECTORS ARE COLLABORATING WITH ARGENTINE SECURITY OFFICIALS, MAKING IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE MONTONEROS TO SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCT OPERATIONS. THE STRONGEST AND LARGEST MONTONERO COLUMN IS COLUMN 25 WHICH IS OPERATING IN THE SOUTHERN AREA OF GREATER BUENOS AIRES. IT HAS 60 TO 80 MEMBERS. THIS COLUMN RECEIVED A SERIOUS SETBACK ON DEC. 14, 1977 WHEN ITS LEADER (RAUL MORTOLA) WAS KILLED IN A CONFRONTATION WITH SECURITY FORCES. HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL OMAR ACTIS IN 1976, COL. ANGEL SURADA IN MAY 1977, OR RODOLFO IARCIE, MANAGER OF ALGODONERA LAVALLOL, AND, ON OCT. 13, 1977, HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANTING A BOMB IN FRONT OF THE HOUSE OF MR. BEECH, MANAGER OF CHRYSLER. THIS SETBACK HAS TEMPORARILY REDUCED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOUTHERN COLUMN WHICH HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR NUMEROUS ATTACKS AGAINST BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL.

4. THE EMBASSY'S OVERALL ASSESSMENT IS THAT ARGENTINA IS SAFE FOR U.S. TOURIST TRAVEL AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS COMING ON PRIVATE VISITS. THE SECURITY SITUATION HAS IMPROVED FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS PERSONNEL AND THEY SHOULD FEEL FREE TO TRAVEL TO ARGENTINA WITH THE CAVEAT

THAT THEY FOLLOW GOOD SECURITY PRACTICES, AVOID PUBLICITY AND THAT THEIR COMPANIES ARE NOT INVOLVED IN ANY SERIOUS LABOR DISPUTES. ALL U.S. BUSINESS EXECUTIVES VISITING ARGENTINA SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO MEET WITH THE EMBASSY SECURITY OFFICER TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC SECURITY SAFEGUARDS TO BE FOLLOWED WHILE IN ARGENTINA.

5. THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES OF U.S. FIRMS PRESENTLY BASED IN ARGENTINA IS APPROXIMATELY 55. CASTRO

*Handwritten signature and initials*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Department of State

OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 097542  
ORIGIN ARA-14

5825

STATE 097542

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 HA-05 TRSE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PH-05  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02  
SS-15 ICA-11 AID-05 SY-05 MCT-01 /084 R

DRAFTED BY ARA:ECA:JNBUMPUS:HG  
APPROVED BY ARA:FJMCNEIL  
ARA/ECA:RWZIMMERMANN

-----039840 152139Z /62

P 152129Z APR 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 097542

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SHUM, AR

SUBJECT: REPRESENTATIONS TO ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR ON DEATHS  
AND DISAPPEARANCES

REF: BUENOS AIRES-2663

1. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MCNEIL CALLED IN ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL ON APRIL 11 TO BACK UP AMBASSADOR CASTRO'S REPRESENTATIONS TO PRESIDENT VIDELA ABOUT THE REPORT OF THE MURDER OF THE TWO FRENCH NUNS AND FIVE QUOTE MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA UNQUOTE.

2. MCNEIL NOTED WE HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT VIDELA, RECOGNIZED THE ARGENTINE SITUATION WAS DIFFICULT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION BY MOVING FROM A NEGATIVE POSITION TO A POSITION OF ABSTENTION IN THE IFIS. NOW HOWEVER WE WERE FACED WITH CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT TWO NUNS AND FIVE OTHER WOMEN HAD BEEN MURDERED WITH THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE OTHER WOMEN HAD BEEN MURDERED. WE COULD ONLY BE PROFOUNDLY CONCERNED BY THIS OUTRAGE, WHICH SEEMED TRACEABLE TO OUT OF CONTROL SECURITY ELEMENTS.

3. AJA ESPIL PUT UP MINIMAL RESISTANCE TO REPORTS OF THE DEATH OF THE NUNS AND THE MOTHERS, STATING THAT IT WOULD BE A "MIRACLE" IF THEY SHOULD APPEAR. AJA ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE EXCESSES IN ARGENTINA, BUT ASKED FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PATIENCE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT ALTHOUGH KIDNAPPINGS AND DISAPPEARANCES CONTINUED, THEY WERE FAR LESS FREQUENT THAN IN THE PAST.

4. MCNEIL RAISED THE PETROUCH AND DEGHI DISAPPEARANCES, WHICH AJA HAD NOT HEARD ABOUT, AS WELL AS THE REPORTED DEATHS OF THE FOUR PRISONERS RELEASED FROM LA PLATA PRISON. FOLLOWING THE INSTRUCTIONS IN STATE 089468, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE MURDERS OF THE NUNS AND THE CONTINUING CREDIBLE REPORTS OF DISAPPEARANCES HAD CAST A PALL OVER OUR EARLIER OPTIMISM THAT THINGS WERE GETTING BETTER IN ARGENTINA. HE PARTICULARLY STRESSED THE NEED FOR FURTHER POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS TO OFFSET THESE TRAGIC EVENTS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THESE EVENTS MADE IT QUITE DIFFICULT FOR THE U.S. TO GO AHEAD WITH THINGS LIKE SPARES AND TRAINING FOR THE ARGENTINES. IN PARTICULAR, SOMETHING MUST BE DONE TO END THE DISAPPEARANCES IF RELATIONS ARE TO IMPROVE.

5. AJA ESPIL, ATTEMPTING TO MITIGATE SOMEWHAT THE NEGATIVE INFORMATION BEING PRESENTED, SHOWED MCNEIL A CABLE FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHICH SAID THAT JACOBO TIMERMAN WOULD SOON BE RELEASED. (AJA, HIMSELF, BASED ON THE DEGHI CASE, EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT TIMERMAN'S SAFETY IF HE WERE RELEASED BUT REQUIRED TO STAY FOR AWHILE IN ARGENTINA AS

NOW PLANNED.) HE INSISTED THE RECORD OF RECENT MONTHS, DESPITE SETBACKS, HAD IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY. AJA REMARKED HE HAD A REAL PROBLEM IN PRESENTING THE ISSUE TO HIS GOVERNMENT. THE REACTION COULD BE STRONG, HE IMPLIED, IF U.S. POSITION HARDENED BECAUSE OF DISAPPEARANCES, SOME OF WHICH WERE SEVERAL MONTHS OLD, JUST AT TIME TIMERMAN WAS FINALLY RELEASED. ZIMMERMANN POINTED OUT WE HAD SIMILAR PROBLEMS IN THAT WHILE WE WILL APPLAUD THE RELEASE OF TIMERMAN, OTHERS CONTINUE TO DISAPPEAR. MCNEIL SAID HE OF COURSE WAS ENCOURAGED ABOUT THIS OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION OF THE GOA'S INTENT TO FREE TIMERMAN, BUT STRESSED HOW TRULY HARMFUL ANY PHYSICAL ATTACKS ON HIM WOULD BE FOR OUR RELATIONS, AND URGED THAT HE BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY UNDER THESE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

6. THE CONVERSATION CLOSED ON A REQUEST BY AJA FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ON CURRENT DISAPPEARANCES. HE PROMISED TO RELAY THIS NEWS BACK TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND EXPLAINED THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO MAKE THE ARGENTINE BUREAUCRATS UNDERSTAND THE SERIOUSNESS WHICH WE ATTACH TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. WE PROMISED TO DO SO.

7. IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH VIDELA AND OTHER SENIOR ARGENTINE LEADERS, PARTICULAR STRESS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE NEED FOR FURTHER POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE NEED TO END DISAPPEARANCES CAUSED BY OUT OF CONTROL SECURITY ELEMENTS. THE EMBASSY SHOULD ALSO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSURING THE SAFETY OF TIMERMAN, ONCE RELEASED.

CHRISTOPHER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27 July 1977

BACKGROUND ARTICLE

How The Montoneros Struck It Rich

One of the most lucrative kidnappings of all times was staged by the Montoneros in Buenos Aires on 19 September 1974. While their abduction of the two Born brothers was, strictly speaking, an internal Argentine matter, the ransom which was exacted has since then allowed the Montoneros to engage in numerous terrorist incidents which have been truly international in character.

According to information provided by leaders of the Montoneros, the planning of the operation against the Born brothers began during late 1973 or early 1974. The Montoneros decided that the firm of Bunge and Born, a multinational conglomerate, was guilty of exploiting its workers, was the "enemy" of small and medium size rural producers who were "bankrupted" by the company's monopolistic policies, and was "acting for its own benefit and profit and not in accord with the national interests of the countries where its businesses were established."

The Montoneros concluded that a kidnaping operation should be conducted against the Bunge and Born company and it should be developed as follows: (1) collection of information on the company itself and on its principal leaders; (2) surveillance of target individuals to establish weaknesses in their defenses; (3) selection of the ambush site; (4) selection of Montonero members to participate in the operation; (5) execution of the ambush itself with subsequent escape of the kidnapers; and finally, (6) announcement of a "trial" of those abducted and imposition of a "sentence" which would include a ransom payment.

The information section of the Montoneros provided the preliminary targeting information. After this initial survey and target analysis, which took several months, it was decided that Jorge Born, Jr., should be the major target of the abduction, since he was the third most important man in the firm and would be the one to direct it in the future. The two senior members of the company, Jorge Born, Sr., and Mario Hirsh, were not chosen because both were considered

27 July 1977

too elderly. When it was observed that Jorge Born, Jr., was normally accompanied by his brother Juan, the Montoneros decided to kidnap both brothers.

The terrorists learned that the Born family lived in the Beccar section of the city, and traveled to their offices in the Federal District every day, Monday through Friday, with great regularity. Each morning a three-car caravan would leave the home, and after leaving children in one of the area's private schools, two of the cars would follow a fixed route to the Born offices. It was determined that the family had at its disposal a total of seven vehicles.

The route used by the Born family was over main streets which were normally choked with traffic and well-patrolled by police units. The kidnapers decided they would deal with this situation by blocking off a short section of the main avenue a minute before the Born vehicles arrived, detouring the Borns to a side street, and then reopening the route before police units discovered the trick. In searching for an obvious reason for a detour, the kidnapers discovered that workers were pruning trees along a section of the main avenue. The next step in this phase of the operation was the selection of the specific side street where the kidnapers could divert the Born vehicles and capture the two brothers.

Thirty Montoneros were chosen for the operation and they were divided into five teams. One team, consisting of three members, was to block the main avenue and then lift the barricade once the Born cars had turned. A nine-man team was to protect the blockaders and then move quickly to the kidnaping site and help protect that team. Two groups consisting of five men each (one dressed as a uniformed policeman) were to crash pickup trucks into the Born automobiles in a fake accident. A fifth team, with six men (including the overall operation leader), would actually kidnap the brothers. Finally, a two-man subteam would eliminate a gatekeeper on the escape route.

The attack was set for 19 September 1974. On that date, according to plan, the Born caravan was detoured onto the side street and the Montoneros' two pickup trucks collided with the Ford Falcons belonging to the Borns. The Montonero disguised as a uniformed policeman, plus six "plainclothes" Montoneros, succeeded in keeping the Borns' guards occupied,

27 July 1977

ostensibly trying to arrest them in connection with the auto accident, while the six-man team removed the Born brothers from their car and led them to one of the waiting escape vehicles. The two Montoneros who had attacked the gatekeeper calmly walked away, leaving two smashed Ford Falcons, two pickup trucks, and five cars--with honking horns--which had been accidentally detoured onto the side street along with the Born caravan.

The Montoneros held a trial of the Born brothers and followed it with a sentencing. The sentence called for the following: a payment equivalent to \$60 million U.S. in cash to the Montoneros, with another \$1 million U.S. in goods to be distributed to specified sectors of the Argentine public; the personal involvement of the Born brothers in company/union negotiations in factories controlled by the Born family; placement of busts of Juan and Eva Peron in all Born factories; and finally, publication of leaflets throughout Argentina to let the public know that the distribution of the goods was made under pressure from the Montoneros as part of the ransom for the safe release of the Born brothers.

The ransom demands were met to the satisfaction of the Montoneros, and the Born brothers were released unharmed several months after the kidnaping. (UNCLASSIFIED)

UNCLASSIFIED  
Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 GRENAD 00028 171733Z  
ACTION DHA-02

7524

INFO OCT-01 ARA-14 ISO-00 ORM-02 IO-14 L-03 SSO-00  
NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00  
PM-04 H-02 INR-07 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 PRS-01  
SP-02 SS-15 MCT-01 /077 W

-----171736Z 117212 /41

O 171626Z JUN 77  
FM USDEL GRENADA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0030

UNCLAS GRENADA 0028

FROM USDEL OASGA

USOAS DEL 15

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PORG, OAS, SHUM  
SUBJ: DRAFT RESOLUTION ON TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS - ARGENTINA

REF: GRENADA 0024

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARGENTINA DRAFT RESOLUTION OF  
HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM:

WHEREAS:

EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF MAN'S ESSENTIAL RIGHTS IS A  
FUNDAMENTAL AND CONTINUING CONCERN OF THE PEOPLES OF  
THE AMERICAS;

THOSE RIGHTS CAN BE VIOLATED BY INDIVIDUALS OR  
TERRORIST GROUPS WHOSE PERSISTENT AND SYSTEMATIC  
CRIMINAL ACTS DISRUPT THE LIFE OF NATIONS;

THE AMERICAN STATES HAVE THE RIGHT AND THE DUTY  
TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR  
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, TO CURB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES  
IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THE LIFE OF NATIONS AND TO  
EFFECTIVELY PROTECT THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS OF THEIR  
INHABITANTS;

THE MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTER-AMERICAN  
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS TO PROMOTE RESPECT FOR  
HUMAN RIGHTS; AND

TO THESE ENDS, THERE SHOULD BE CLOSE COOPERATION  
BETWEEN THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS  
AND THE MEMBER STATES OF THE OAS.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLVES:

1. TO INSTRUCT THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON  
HUMAN RIGHTS TO INITIATE A SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE WITH  
THE MEMBER STATES ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED  
BY INDIVIDUALS OR TERRORIST GROUPS AND ON THE POSSIBILITIES  
FOR AND MEANS OF PERFORMING ITS DUTY IN THESE CASES.

2. TO INSTRUCT THE PERMANENT COUNCIL TO DRAW UP  
SPECIFIC AND UP-TO-DATE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE INTER-  
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS SO THAT:

A. IT MAY DEAL WITH INSTANCES OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY INDIVIDUALS OR TERRORIST GROUPS,  
AND

B. IT MAY WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE OAS  
MEMBER STATES AFFECTED BY SUCH ACTS, SO AS TO EFFECTIVELY  
FULFILL ITS GOAL OF PROMOTING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.  
MCGEE

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 5459

PAGE 01 BUENOS 04716 192123Z

73  
ACTION ARA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 SP-02 INR-05

CIAE-00 L-01 IO-03 SCCT-01 SY-02 PRS-01 /041 W  
066976

P 192102Z JUL 76  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6395

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 4716

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: ASEC, PFOR, PINT, AR  
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON INTERIOR MINISTER

FROM AMBASSADOR HILL (APPROVED BY HIM FOR TRANSMISSION PRIOR  
TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR US ON JULY 18)

1. ON JULY 15 ACCOMPANIED BY THE LEGAL ATTACHE I CALLED ON MIN  
OF INTERIOR HARGUINDEGUY. THE PURPOSE OF MY CALL WAS TO AGAIN  
IMPRESS UPON THE MINISTER THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE QUESTION OF  
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. RATHER THAN RAISE THE QUESTION DIRECTLY,  
I REFERRED TO POSSIBLE SECURITY RISKS TO A LARGE MEDICAL  
CONVENTION WHICH IS TO BE HELD HERE IN 1977 AS A MEANS OF LEADING  
INTO THE SUBJECT OF TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA.

2. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, THE MIN SAID THAT GOA HAS SCORED  
IMPORTANT SUCCESSES AGAINST TERRORISTS AND THAT BY MARCH OF  
NEXT YEAR THE TERRORIST PROBLEM WILL BE BEHIND US. HOWEVER,  
HE SAID, HE EXPECTED SERIOUS TROUBLE BETWEEN NOW AND THE FIRST  
OF SEPTEMBER. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE MONTONEROS AND THE  
ERP ARE COMING TOGETHER AS ONE TERRORIST GROUP AND THEY ARE  
VERY WELL ARMED. HE INDICATED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE ERP  
REPORTEDLY HAS SOME 5,000 SOPHISTICATED INCENDIARY DEVICES  
PURCHASED IN GERMANY IN 1973 (WHICH, HOWEVER, MAY NOW BE TOO  
OLD TO BE EFFECTIVE). THE MINISTER FELT THAT THE WEEKS JUST  
BEFORE AND AFTER "TRELEW DAY", AUGUST 22, WOULD BE THE MOST

~~SECRET~~



# Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BUENOS 04716 192123Z

MOST DANGEROUS PERIOD.

3. THE MINISTER SAID HE WAS IN CONTROL OF THE SECURITY FORCES, AND THE NEW POLICE CHIEF GENERAL OJEDA IS HIS MAN. HE REMARKED, HOWEVER, THAT THE EMBASSY MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS HARD TO CONTROL ALL UNITS OF THE POLICE AND MILITARY, AND THAT ACTIONS SUCH AS THE KILLING OF THE PRIESTS COULD HAPPEN.

4. I POINTED OUT THAT WHILE THIS MIGHT BE SO, THE DEATHS OF THE PRIESTS AND OF ANTHONY PUENTE (SON OF A LONG TIME EMBASSY EMPLOYEE) ARE VERY HARD TO EXPLAIN IN THE US.

5. THE MINISTER DID NOT TAKE ME UP ON THESE INCIDENTS; RATHER, HE CHANGED THE SUBJECT BY REFERRING TO A RECENT BARRONS' ARTICLE COMPARING BEIRUT WITH BUENOS AIRES. HE SAID THIS WAS VERY UNFAIR, AND NOTED THAT AMB MUSICH HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INVITE TWO OR THREE BARRONS' REPORTERS TO BUENOS AIRES TO TAKE A LOOK FOR THEMSELVES.

6. IN CONCLUDING THE DISCUSSION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION, THE MINISTER ASSURED ME THAT ERP AND MONTONERO LEADERS, SANTUCHO AND FIRMECH RESPECTIVELY, ARE IN ARGENTINA AND THAT THE GOA IS BENDING ALL EFFORTS TO APPREHEND THEM.

7. COMMENT: IN MY CONTACTS WITH THE MINISTER THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A GOOD GIVE AND TAKE. ON THIS OCCASION, I BELIEVE HE APPRECIATED MY EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION TO HIM FOR THE ROLE HE PLAYED IN EXPELLING THE THREE DRUG TRAFFICKERS TO THE US. I AM POSITIVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE UP ITS MIND TO USE ALL MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO ELIMINATE THE TERRORISTS ONCE AND FOR ALL, BUT THOSE IN GOVERNMENT ARE LIKELY TO TURN A DEAF EAR TO ADVICE FROM ABROAD ON THE TOPIC. RIGHTLY OR WRONG, THE GOVERNMENT IS CONVINCED THAT IT IS THREATENED BY A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND THEREFORE MUST DEFEAT THE TERRORISTS AT ALL COSTS.  
CHAPLIN

~~SECRET~~





Declassified Case: NW 52831 Date: 10-24-2013

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 8715

PAGE 01 BUENOS 04487 082139Z

54  
ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 SCCT-01

INR-07 CIAE-00 SY-05 /053 W.

062741

P 082112Z JUL 76  
FM ~~EMBASSY~~ BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6290

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 4487

E. O. 11652: XGDS-2  
TAGS: ASEC, PINT, PINS, AR  
SUBJECT: FURTHER ON MURDER OF CATHOLIC PRIESTS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 4443

1. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION SUBSEQUENT TO REFTEL WHICH CONFIRMS THAT PRIESTS WERE MURDERED BY GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES. HOWEVER, IT IS NOW CLEAR THEY WERE KILLED BY MEMBERS OF FEDERAL POLICE, NOT BY ARMY. POLICE BELIEVED THE TWO SEMINARIANS WERE INVOLVED WITH "THIRD WORLD" MOVEMENT OF PRIESTS, WHICH HAS HEADQUARTERS NOT FAR FROM THE CHURCH; HENCE, THEY WERE CONSIDERED FAIR GAME IN WAVE OF VIGILANTE-TYPE EXECUTIONS POLICE HAVE CARRIED OUT IN RETALIATION FOR BOMBING OF POLICE OFFICE ON JULY 2 (SEE SEPTTEL). ACCORDING TO LEGATT SOURCES, POLICE NEVER AT ANY TIME BELIEVED MONTONERO LEADER FIRMEINICH HAD BEEN SHELTERED BY PRIESTS. THAT IS SIMPLY A FABRICATED STORY THEY ARE PUTTING OUT IN ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY A MURDER WHICH EVEN BY ARGENTINE STANDARDS WAS EXCEEDINGLY BRUTAL AND MINDLESS. POLICE SOURCES HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT MURDERS WERE COMMITTED BY NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITHOUT ANY HIGHER AUTHORIZATION.

2. AMBASSADOR HILL AND RSO SAW PAPAL NUNCIO JULY 8. LATTER SAYS ALLEGATION THAT PRIESTS HAD SHELTERED FIRMEINICH IS AN OUT-AND-OUT LIE. HE ALSO SAID REPORT

~~SECRET~~



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BUENOS 04487 082139Z

THAT NUNS HAD BEEN KILLED WAS "SOMEONE'S IMAGINATION." NUNCIO INDICATED CHURCH HAD BEEN CONCERNED THAT ONE OF THE SEMINARIANS MIGHT HAVE SOME "THIRD WORLD" CONNECTIONS. NUNCIO EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN IF SUCH WERE THE CASE, THAT HARDLY JUSTIFIED MURDER OF SEMINARIANS, LET ALONE OF PRIESTS WHO WERE IN NO WAY INVOLVED.

3. NUNCIO INDICATED CARDINAL ARAMBURU HAD STATED FLATLY TO MINISTER OF INTERIOR THAT CHURCH KNEW BEYOND ANY DOUBT THAT IT WAS GOA SECURITY FORCES WHO HAD MURDERED THE PRIESTS. ARAMBURU SAID FURTHER TO HAVE TOLD MINISTER THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER THAT LATTER MAKE NO COMMENT SINCE A DENIAL WOULD SIMPLY BE A LIE. MINISTER OBLIGED AND REMAINED SILENT.

4. NUNCIO INFORMED AMBASSADOR HILL THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY ONE RANKING OFFICIAL OF GOA THAT GOVT INTENDED TO "CLEAN UP THE CATHOLIC CHURCH". NUNCIO CLAIMED "SOME GENERALS" WANTED A CATHOLIC HIERARCHY "SUCH AS WE HAD IN ARGENTINA TWO HUNDRED YEARS AGO." NUNCIO SPECULATED THAT MURDER OF THE PRIESTS MIGHT BE FIRST STEP IN "CLEANING UP" THE CHURCH.

5. COMMENT. NUNCIO SAID HE FEARED MURDER OF PRIESTS MAY PRESAGE A WAVE OF RIGHT-WING TERROR WORSE THAN ANYTHING WE HAVE SEEN BEFORE. GIVEN CORBETTA'S FAILURE TO BRING POLICE TERROR UNDER CONTROL AND INTERIOR MINISTER'S REMARKS LAST NIGHT LAUDING POLICE AND SUGGESTING THEY WILL TAKE ANY MEASURE THEY DEEM NECESSARY IN COMBATTING SUBVERSION, EMBASSY IS INCLINED TO AGREE.  
HILL

~~SECRET~~



# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6381

PAGE 01 BUENOS 62738 271221Z

53  
ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PH-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 CIAE-00  
DUDE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 USIA-06 PRS-01 SY-05  
USSS-00 /060 W

006190

R 262112Z APR 76  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5395

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 2738

R.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PINT, SHUM, ASEC, AR  
SUBJECT: GENERAL VIDELA BEGINS TO CONTROL RIGHT-WING TERRORISM?

REF: BUENOS AIRES 2528

1. FOLLOWING VIDELA MEETING WITH SENIOR GENERALS IN WHICH HE MADE CLEAR HIS DESIRE THAT RIGHT-WING TERRORISM BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL (REF A), LEGATT SOURCES REPORT THAT CORPS. COMMANDERS, TAKING VIDELA'S ADMONITIONS TO HEART, CRACKED DOWN ON POLICE UNITS WHICH HAD BEEN CARRYING OUT EXTRALEGAL REPRISALS AGAINST SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. ARMY OFFICERS WENT SO FAR AS TO REMOVE FROM POLICE CONTROL THOSE ARRESTED TERRORISTS WHO SHOWED SIGNS OF MALTREATMENT, TRANSFERRING THEM TO MILITARY BASES WHERE THEY ARE NOW RECEIVING PROPER MEDICAL ATTENTION. IN ADDITION, MILITARY COMMANDERS ARE NOW ENGAGED IN PRODUCING ON PRIORITY BASIS COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF THOSE PERSONS WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED ON POLITICAL, SUBVERSIVE OR CORRUPTION CHARGES SINCE COUP. WHILE UNDER PRESSURE FROM VIDELA TO PRODUCE LIST BY END OF THIS WEEK, IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THERE MAY BE SOME SLIPPAGE AS MILITARY COMMANDERS TRY TO FIND OUT WHAT HAPPENED TO THOSE PERSONS ORIGINALLY LISTED AS ARRESTED BY POLICE BUT NOW UNACCOUNTED FOR.

2. ON APRIL 23 A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT IN THE FUTURE THE PRESS COULD NOT, WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION FROM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BUENOS 02738 271221Z

THE GOVERNMENT, PUBLISH ACCOUNTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS OR PUBLISH REPORTS ABOUT BODIES FOUND AND PRESUMED TO BE THE WORK OF SOME TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. THE SPOKESMAN WHO RELEASED THIS INFORMATION NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT FELT ITSELF TO BE "IN A STATE OF WAR" AND WAS TAKING THIS ACTION TO DENY TERRORISTS PUBLICITY THEY NEED TO KEEP THEIR MOVEMENTS GOING. IT WAS NOT, HE EMPHASZED, RELATED TO ANY BROADER ISSUE OF PRESS CENSORSHIP.

3. COMMENT: FACT THAT ARMY COMMANDERS HAVE MOVED TO CURB RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE AND HAVE GONE SO FAR AS TO ACT AGAINST POLICE SEEN AS VERY ENCOURAGING SIGN BY POLITICAL OBSERVERS. EMBASSY POLITICAL CONTACTS ACROSS BROAD SPECTRUM OF PARTIES CONTINUE TO VOICE THEIR "SURPRISE" THAT MILITARY ACTING IN SUCH MODERATE MANNER. WITH REGARD TO PRESS, REPORTING OF TERRORISM IS CAUSING CONCERN AS OBSERVERS WAIT TO SEE HOW THIS NEW ACTION WILL WORK OUT IN PRACTICE.  
HILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Declassified Case: NW 52831 Date:  
10-24-2012

# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1587

PAGE 01 BUENOS 01896 230721Z

21  
ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 OMB-01  
AID-05 SCCT-01 SY-05 /069 W  
\*\*\*\*\* 004931

P 222125Z MAR 76  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 1896

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PINS, PINT, ELAB, AR  
SUBJECT: TERRORIST TOLL CONTINUES HIGH

REF: BUENOS AIRES 1791

1. SUMMARY: WITH LOCAL PRESS OPENLY REPORTING THAT COUP MAY TAKE PLACE "WITHIN HOURS", DEATH TOLL FROM TERRORIST ACTS NEARING ALL-TIME HIGH. PRIVATELY, POLITICAL CONTACTS VOICING CONCERN THAT MANY OF THE DEAD ARE "PRE-COUP VICTIMS" OF PROVINCIAL MILITARY AND POLICE VENGEANCE. END SUMMARY.

2. LONG-TIME OBSERVERS OF ARGENTINE POLITICAL SCENE STATE THAT PUBLIC REPORTING OF IMMINENT COUP IS WITHOUT PRECEDENT IN MODERN ARGENTINE HISTORY. GIVEN WIDESPREAD PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF IDEA THAT COUP IMMINENT, CHIEF CONCERN OF MOST EMBASSY CONTACTS IS THAT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL POLICE AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES DESPITE REPEAT DESPITE ORDERS FROM HIGHER COMMAND ARE MOVING TO SETTLE SCORES WITH LOCAL LEFTISTS, LABOR STUDENTS AND OTHER ANTAGONISTS. FROM MAR 1 TO 20 OF THIS YEAR FORTY-SIX PERSONS HAVE DIED AS A RESULT OF TERRORIST ACTS OF BOTH RIGHT AND LEFT. ANOTHER TWELVE TO FIFTEEN DIED OVER LAST WEEKEND. FROM BEGINNING OF YEAR TO DATE, OVER 165 PERSONS HAVE BEEN KILLED AS RESULT OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BUENOS 01896 230721Z

3. WHILE POLITICAL VIOLENCE PER SE IS NOT NEW FEATURE OF ARGENTINE SCENE, THERE IS INCREASING CONCERN AMONG CIVILIANS, POLITICIANS, AND NEWSMEN, INCLUDING THOSE WHO LOOK ON A COUP FAVORABLY, THAT LATEST ACTS MAY FORESHADOW INABILITY OF ARMY COMMAND AND POLICE AUTHORITY TO CONTROL THEIR SUBORDINATES WHEN THE COUP COMES. ONE LEFTIST POLITICIAN TOLD EMBOFF OVER WEEKEND THAT HE HAS BECOME FERVENT SUPPOTER OF VIDELA-VIOLA COUP SAYING THAT "IF THEY DON'T DO IT SOON SOME HARD-LINE GENERAL IN THE PROVINCES WILL PUSH THEM ASIDE AND PLUNGE THE COUNTRY INTO BLOODBATH IN MISGUIDED EFFORT TO PURIFY THE BODY POLITIC." WHILE SOMEWHAT OVERDRAWN, THE FEAR IS SHARED AMONG RESPONSIBLE CIVILIANS.

4. THE FACT THAT MANY OF LATEST ACTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN REMOTE AREAS FAR FROM FEDERAL CAPITAL OR PRINCIPAL CITIES AND THAT VICTIMS IN THESE AREAS ARE MORE OFTEN THAN NOT "LEFTISTS" ADDS CREDENCE TO THESE FEARS. WHILE ALL KILLINGS MAY NOT BE WORK OF MILITARY AND POLICE, IT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT MANY ARE. THE KILLING OF SANTILLAN, LEFTIST SEGGEN OF TUQUAN SUGAR WORKERS FEDERATION (FOTIA), WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY THE WORK OF THE MILITARY OR POLICE. HE WAS ASSASSINATED IN HIS UNION HEADQUARTERS MIDDAY TODAY, MAR 22. SANTILLAN HAD LONG HISTORY OF COLLABORATION WITH TROTSKYITE LEADERS TOSCO AND SALAMANCA, BUT REPORTEDLY HAD REACHED LIVE AND LET LIVE ACCORD WITH NATIONAL PERONIST LABOR LEADERSHIP APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS AGO. HE IS MOST PROMINENT LABOR LEADER KILLED WITHIN RECENT MONTHS.

5. COMMENT: LATEST TURN IN TERRORIST ACTS ATTRIBUTED TO MILITARY ADD SUBSTANCE TO COMMENTS EMBOFFS HAVE RECEIVED FROM SOURCES IN RECENT DAYS STATING "NATURE OF COUP PRESENTLY PLANNED TO BE MODERATE AND LEGALISTIC WILL NOT BE DETERMINED UNTIL THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT VIDELA-VIOLA-MASSERA ET AL WILL IN EVENT BE ABLE TO IMPOSE THIS POLICY ON THEIR SUBORDINATES."  
WOODWARD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3050 POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 BUENOS 01791 181351Z

10  
ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SCOT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02  
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15  
USIA-06 SY-05 OMB-01 AID-05 /069 W  
----- 067298

R 181252Z MAR 76  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4895

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 1791

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PINS, AR  
SUBJECT: TERRORIST ACTIVITIES CONTINUE AT HIGH LEVEL

1. SUMMARY: AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF INCREASED PUBLIC DISCUSSION RE AN IMMINENT MILITARY GOLPE, TERRORIST DEPREDATIONS IN RECENT DAYS HAVE ADDED TO A MOOD OF HEIGHTENED ANXIETY AMONG THE GENERAL POPULACE. END SUMMARY.

2. THE KIDNAPPINGS IN CORDOBA, WHICH HAVE RUN AT AN EXTRAORDINARY RATE IN PAST MONTH, CONTINUE UNABATED. IN ADDITION TO THE FIFTY PLUS VICTIMS REPORTED IN THE PRESS IN LAST MONTH, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT MANY MORE CASES HAVE GONE UNREPORTED. THIS, ALONG WITH THE BOMBINGS, SHOOTINGS, AND ECONOMIC UNREST IN THE PROVINCE, HAVE LEFT THE POPULACE BADLY FRIGHTENED AND ANGRY. BOMBINGS, MURDERS AND KIDNAPPINGS, HAVE ALSO TAKEN PLACE IN THE LAST FEW DAYS IN SALTA, JUJUY, TUCUMAN, ETC., SPREADING MOOD OF ANXIETY THROUGHOUT COUNTRY.

3. IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL, IN ADDITION TO THE BOMBING OF ARMY HEADQUARTERS WHICH KILLED ONE PERSON AND WOUNDED TWENTY-EIGHT, TERRORISTS HAVE IN LAST 48 HOURS SET OFF OVER TWENTY BOMBS AND CARRIED OUT SEVERAL ATTACKS AGAINST POLICEMEN AND PROPERTY. A NUMBER OF POLICEMEN IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL, ONE IN MAR DEL PLATA, AND ONE IN LA PLATA, WERE KILLED IN THESE ACTS. IN THE BARRIO NORTE-PALERMO AREA OF THE FED CAPITAL,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BUENOS 01791 181351Z

WELL OVER TWENTY BOMBS EXPLODED ON NIGHT OF MAR 16. SEVERAL AMERICAN COMPANIES HAVE REPORTED RECEIVING THREATENING CALLS AND LETTERS DURING PAST FEW DAYS, MOSTLY FROM MONTONEROS.

4. LEFTIST TERRORISTS HAVE TAKEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAJORITY OF THESE ACTS THOUGH ONE OF POLICEMEN KILLED WAS GUARDING JESUS PORTO, A PERONIST CONGRESSMAN WHOSE NAME IS ON THE AAA'S DEATH LIST. BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, ARGENTINES TEND TO SEE THESE ACTIONS AS TERRORIST ATTEMPT TO PUSH MILITARY INTO FINAL DECISION TO CARRY OUT A COUP. AS ONE PAPER, LA OPINION, PUT IT, ANY ORGANIZED SOCIETY IS VULNERABLE TO TERRORIST ACTS. WHAT IS DISTRESSING ABOUT ARGENTINE CASE IS THAT THE VULNERABILITY EXTENDS FAR BEYOND THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF THOSE DIRECTLY INVOLVED AND GIVEN FRAGILITY OF PRESENT INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, THESE OTHERWISE POINTLESS ACTS MAY SUCCEED.

5. WHILE LEFTIST TERRORISTS ARE CARRYING OUT OPERATIONS AT AN ALMOST UNPRECEDENTED LEVEL, ONE SIGN OF INTERNAL STRAIN SURFACED THIS WEEK. APPARENTLY REALIZING THAT SEVERAL RECENT POLICE RAIDS HAD RESULTED FROM INFO RECEIVED FROM JAILED MONTONERO LEADER ROBERTO QUIETO, THE MONTONEROS ISSUED STATEMENT "SENTENCING" QUIETO TO DEATH FOR HAVING SOLD OUT TO POLICE.  
REAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

P750187-0696

RS/R	REP	AF	ARA
EUR	FE	NEA	CU
INR	EB	P	IO
4	4		
	FO	AID	S/PAS
PM	4	4	S/S
2	1	2	10
S/CT		54	3
1			
AGR	COM	FRB	INT
	10		
LAB	TAR	TR	XMB
4			
AIR	ARMY	NAVY	OSD
5	3	5	26
USIA	NSA	CIA	
7	3	16	
UPIE		USSS	
5		1	

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

Original to be Filed in \_\_\_\_\_ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

A-248

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: DIA/DOD Washington D.C.  
 USCINCSO  
 AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO  
 AMEMBASSY ASUNCION  
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
 AMCONGEN RIO DE JANEIRO

DATE: Dec 2, 1975

FROM: AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ELAB, PINS, AR

SUBJECT: INDUSTRIAL TERRORISM: GUERRILLA WARFARE ON THE  
FACTORY FLOOR

REF: BA-7538

INTRODUCTION Terrorism is a fact and a way of life in Argentina. The guerrilla activities in the rural areas of Tucumán and the urban areas of Córdoba and Buenos Aires have been the subject of world-wide comment and endless analysis. However, another and possibly even more insidious form of guerrilla warfare, to which little attention has heretofore been paid, is in full operation in Argentina. It is the war being carried out by the industrial guerrilla, who operates on the factory floor, in the union hall and, increasingly, in concert with management. His tactics are those used by his rural and urban cousins, but refined to the necessities of his particular environment. He aims to radicalize the workers, alienate them from their legitimate leaders and their government, and win their sympathy so that they become his willing accomplices or docile followers.

The industrial guerrilla's efforts have been met with considerable success, and only now are the dangers and extent of those efforts being fully appreciated by the government and the populace. Consequently, some formal action, probably military, to combat the industrial guerrilla can be expected in the near timeframe (see Reftel). However, repressive actions alone cannot eradicate the underlying problems which nourish the terrorists. Thus, the industrial guerrilla is likely to remain a fact of Argentine life for the foreseeable future.

## POST ROUTING

TO:	Action	Info.	Initials
AMB/PO			
DCM			
POL			
ECON			
CONS			
ADM			
AID			
USIS			
FILE			

Action Taken:

Date:

Initials:

FORM 10-64 DS-323

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

For Department Use Only

☐ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: LABAT, RGamble/mip.-

Drafting Date: 11-28-75

Phone No.: 290

Contents and Classification Approved by: POLCOUNS: WSSmith

Clearances: ECOM: WBeal (in draft)

USIS: HWoodward (in draft)

CHARGE: JJMont

POL/R: DSmock (in draft)

DAO: PCoughlin (in draft) POL:RMartin (in draft)

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

AmEmbassy Buenos Aires

A- 248

Page 2

An objective analysis of the factory guerrilla is impossible as concrete information on his plans and operations is unobtainable. This report, therefore, attempts only to outline the scope of the problem, to chronicle the public's increasing awareness and concern, and to cite examples of industrial guerrilla tactics as described by a wide range of political, management and labor sources.

\* \* \* \* \*

Embassy reporting has consistently pointed out the increasing alienation of the Argentine organized labor leadership from its rank-and-file. With the exception of only a handful of unions, the current national labor leaders are now virtually divorced from the workers they represent. Their authority has eroded to the point that rank-and-file parallel unions, usually called plant "Struggle Committees" or "Coordinating Committees", have virtually replaced elected union delegates in negotiations at the plant level. Invariably, those grass-roots committees are far more militant than their legitimate leaders. As a result, "illegal" strikes and gangster-style tactics are becoming increasingly common.

In the viewpoint of many Argentine military, political and labor leaders, that increased militancy is caused by leftist subversives who are attempting to gain control of the working class. While that viewpoint is not wholly based on objective analysis, as many believe that all worker militancy is indistinguishable from subversion, there is little doubt that it has some basis in fact. Although the extent to which terrorist organizations are responsible for the new militancy is not statistically demonstrable, they are extremely active and there is ample evidence that they have encountered considerable success on the factory floor.

The newsmedia and Argentines in general are becoming increasingly preoccupied with this aspect of subversive activity. Few days pass without some reference to it in the newsmedia. Publicly and privately, politicians, businessmen, military and labor leaders stress the seriousness of the problem. Following are some representative observations.

Radical Party (UCR) President Balbin commented at a press interview that he was deeply concerned as it was obvious that the "factory guerrilla is serving foreign interests". National Deputy Antonio Troccoli, who represents Buenos Aires Province, told Emboff Nov 24 that the factory terrorists were a "disastrous influence" and that

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

AmEmbassy Buenos Aires

A- 248

Page 3

they controlled the main industrial plants in Greater Buenos Aires. Senator Eduardo Angeloz, who represents Córdoba Province, lamented to Emboff that most factories in Córdoba were controlled by the ERP and Montoneros and that management there now negotiates directly with the terrorist controlled internal committees rather than with the elected union leadership.

Both American and Argentine businessmen contacted by the reporting officer claimed that terrorists are responsible for the vast majority of cases of labor indiscipline in their factories. During visits to their plants, the reporting officer was advised by the American managers of US owned automobile and tire factories that through their system of management "spies" they had identified 120 and 80 terrorist employees, respectively. They said they were keeping them under surveillance but that neither they nor the union was able to neutralize them. (However, as in almost all such cases, the terrorist employees were identified only as "communist agitators". The managers were unable to be more specific and, in fact, left little doubt that they considered every labor "agitator" to be a communist infiltrator).

Except for only a few instances, labor leaders contacted by the reporting officer tended to agree with the businessmen that all factory oppositionists were communist subversives. They, more than any other group, see the hand of "foreign interests" in the militant challenges to their authority. The only differentiation they were able to make when pressed for specifics was that the "Montoneros control the Greater Buenos Aires area and the ERP controls the interior areas". Although they are deeply concerned over the problem, they have thus far been incapable of finding any effective means to combat it. Their only suggested "solution" is for the police and military forces to suppress any "unauthorized" act of the workers.

While the Military is not yet prepared to enforce trade union discipline, it is becoming increasingly concerned with the subversive aspects of the problem. But, as with all the other sectors, the Military also has difficulties in distinguishing between real subversion and more legitimate workers militancy. For example, during an early November interview published in MERCADO, then given wide press play, Army General Carlos Delia observed that the factory guerrilla was of special concern to the Military. After commenting that the infiltrators were arming themselves to fight the management personnel, he said that subversion was being carried out by "absenteeism, industrial sabotage and worker control over production". It hardly needs to be pointed out that absenteeism is a many faceted problem, only a

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

AmEmbassy Buenos Aires

A- 248

Page 4

small part of which can be attributed to subversive activities, and worker control is a tenent of Peronist labor philosophy.

Although the Military has been aware of the problem, its involvement thus far has been very low-key. One knowledgeable army officer advised the Defense Attaché that the army, in response to requests by plant managers, has had some soldiers assigned to a few plants during the past few months. The Military's first highly publicized participation in the war against factory subversion occurred on March 20, 1975 when, following a Ministry of Interior denunciation of a "vast subversive operation" by the ERP in the Villa Constitución industrial area, military troops were used to arrest union leaders and break a metal workers strike. The Ministry's failure to support its charges of subversion tended to discredit the entire operation and the Military quickly terminated its participation. However, the Military again entered the fray on November 18 when the Army intervened in a strike at the HIPASAM mine in Sierra Grande. Charging that the labor/management confrontation was being orchestrated by a small group of subversives, the Army broke the strike by arresting over 300 workers, including the entire local union leadership.

The November 18 action obviously marks a turning point in the Military involvement in the war against industrial terrorism. During the past few days the Press has reported that the Military is holding conversations with management on how best to combat factory subversion. Additionally, the Nov 26 press reported that the "factory guerrilla problem" was being considered in an ongoing meeting of the Armed Forces' Commanders in Chief. As the Military is now engaged in a major campaign against terrorist organizations throughout the country, it can be expected that they will also commit additional resources to combat the terrorists who operate on the factory floor.

While public concern with the problem of industrial subversion is easy to chronicle, demonstrable acts and activities of the factory terrorists are virtually impossible to come by. However, there have been some incidents which do provide some insight into their operations. At one level, murder, kidnappings, and intimidation of management personnel are part and parcel of their tactics to win over the workers. Industrial Relations and Personnel Officers appear to be the major targets for assassination when management refuses to accede to workers' demands. In practically all incidents of such assassinations in recent months, one or another of the terrorist organizations claimed credit for "solving" the workers' problems by "removing" the management "exploiters". It can be accepted, therefore, that the killings are by terrorists rather than by the workers themselves. Following such killings or kidnappings of management personnel, the affected firm almost invariably complies

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

AmEmbassy Buenos Aires

A- 248

Page 5

fully with the terrorists' terms, which normally consist of granting requested economic demands, payment of lost wages, and reinstatement of all discharged workers.

Management probably has little alternative but to accede to those demands. One firm which refused to and instead closed its doors was the country's major producer of synthetic fibers, Hilanderías Olmos. In taking its case to the public, Hilanderías Olmos stated that it was forced to close down following an absolute breakdown in labor discipline, almost daily threats against management by workers and terrorists, and the assassination of its Personnel Officer. It charged that despite repeated requests for police, Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Economy assistance, absolutely none was forthcoming. Instead, the company was intervened by the government following its decision to close down and placed in the hands of a union interventor. In contrast to Hilanderías Olmos' decision, most foreign firms comply with the terrorists' demands, then transfer all of their foreign nationals out of the country. The most recent move was by Mercedes-Benz, which shipped its entire non-Argentine management team to Uruguay in November.

Even if management can positively identify the guerrillas in its work force, it finds itself virtually incapable of acting against them. On November 24, the reporting officer visited a major Buenos Aires textile factory, which employs 15,000 workers, and was given the following information by management officials. It was the only case in which specifics concerning terrorist activities were offered. Five members of the ERP work in the key section of the plant, which produces the raw material for the entire factory system. The five do not hide their terrorist affiliation and, in fact, informed management that they were ERP members. According to the official who gave the information, management, the workers and the union delegates are all "scared to death" of them. They have threatened both management and workers with death if anything should happen to them. Accordingly, they are left unmolested. Management has not notified either the police or the military of their presence as they are convinced that the threats will be carried out if the ERP members are arrested. The terrorists' activities are normally limited to propagandizing, but they do occasionally call for work slowdowns or stoppages. Invariably, the workers comply. In the case of this factory, therefore, the terrorists do not use specific intimidations to obtain specific ends, but rather a general intimidation to obtain acquiescence with their daily activities.

Another guerrilla tactic is to use direct threats against workers. Both labor leaders and management officials described the following tactics to the reporting officer. Workers are first told by the factory guerrillas to comply with the latter's call for a slowdown, walk-out, etc.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

AmEmbassy Buenos Aires

A- 248

Page 6

If a worker declines, he is harrassed at his workplace. If he is still rebellious, he can expect to receive threatening calls, his wife or parents receive calls or letters advising that he will be killed if he doesn't comply, his child or parent may be "kidnapped" for a few hours as evidence of what might happen, his house may be bombed, and, as a final warning to others, he may be seized from his home, brutalized, mutilated then filled with bullets or blown to pieces. Accordingly, the message gets to the rest of the workers. Those tactics, however, are more likely to be those of the ERP rather than the Montoneros. The latter, working through the Young Peronist Workers (Juventud Trabajadora Peronista - JTP), apparently are attempting to win over the workers to their own cause. Consequently they concentrate more on intimidation and killing of management personnel rather than on harrassment of workers.

In addition to tactics designed to intimidate and/or influence the workers, the factory guerrilla also deals directly with the union in some instances. In some cases they have successfully won over the shop-level union leadership. In other cases they capture a union meeting and either through fear or simple aggressiveness force through their proposals. The head of the Buenos Aires Customs Workers Union described the following incident to the reporting officer. During the first part of November the Buenos Aires Port-Railway Workers union was agitating for a wage increase. At a general meeting the union agreed to accept a management's proposal for a P 3,000 raise. After the proposal was accepted unanimously, a group of about ten young men entered the meeting, took the rostrum and insisted that the union hold out for a P 5,000 raise and declare an immediate strike in support of that demand. As it was clear that they were terrorists, no one dared oppose them. Accordingly, the union declared a strike and shut down the port.

All of the above mentioned tactics have been used in labor disputes with management. It is presumed that they are the work of industrial terrorists rather than militant workers, although the latter are also capable of using some of them. The obvious end of such tactics is to discredit the elected union leadership, undermine management and the government, and radicalize the workers to the point that they become willing adherents or docile followers of the terrorists.

In sum, the factory guerrilla now ranks with his urban and rural cousins as a major subversive threat. The public and government and military authorities are just now beginning to appreciate the extent to which he has been successful. No concerted plans have yet been prepared to counter industrial subversion, but some, primarily military,

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~


AmEmbassy Buenos Aires

A- 248

Page 7

can be expected within the near time frame. The long run battle against terrorist subversion, however, will depend not only on military action, but also on government moves to ameliorate the underlying conditions which gave rise to the social discontent which sustains the terrorist. Unfortunately, for Argentina and the Argentines, it appears that repressive actions will be the only response which the present political leadership will be able to visualize. As a result, industrial terrorism and the factory guerrilla can be expected to be a part of the Argentine scene for quite some time yet.

MONTLLOR



~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~



Declassified Case: NW 52831 Date:  
10-24-2013

# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6561

PAGE 01 BUENOS 07115 282156Z

66  
ACTION L-03

**ACTION COPY**

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 ISO-00 SCCT-01 /011 W

03636 LEGAL ADVISER

R 282110Z OCT/75  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5239

OCT 29 1975

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 7115

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

F.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, XX

SUBJECT: DATA ON HOST COUNTRY LAW AND POLICY CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

REFS: A) A-7876 OF OCT 8, 1974, B) STATE 251824

1. UPON RECEIPT OF REF A, EMBASSY APPROACHED MINISTRY OF JUSTICE WITH REQUEST FOR COMPILATION OR LIST OF PERTINENT LAWS, ESPECIALLY AS THEY RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CITED IN REFERENCE. MINISTRY INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY. AS MONTHS PASSED, EMBASSY CHECKED SEVERAL TIMES. IN JUNE OF THIS YEAR, MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVE ASSURED US THEY HAD NOT FORGOTTEN PROJECT, BUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN SO MANY LAWS PASSED DEALING WITH TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA--AND IT IS POSITION OF GOA THAT THIS IS INTERNATIONALLY INSPIRED, HENCE WITHIN PURVIEW OF PROPOSED STUDY--THAT COMPILATION WAS A MAJOR TASK. MINISTRY ALREADY OVERWORKED AND COMPILATION WOULD HAVE NO IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON SITUATION; HENCE, THEY WOULD GET TO IT AS THEY COULD.

2. SINCE JUNE, NEW MINISTER AND WHOLE NEW TEAM HAVE BEEN APPOINTED AT MINISTRY. GREAT CONFUSION REIGNS THERE AND THERE MAY SOON BE NEW CHANGES IN PERSONNEL, POSSIBLY UP TO MINISTERIAL LEVEL. GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, EMBASSY HAS LITTLE HOPE THAT OUR REQUEST WILL BE ATTENDED TO ANY TIME SOON.

3. EMBASSY ITSELF, HOWEVER, HAS OVER PAST FEW YEARS REPORTED PROMULGATION OF MOST SIGNIFICANT NEW PROVISIONS DEALING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
16





*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BUENOS 07115 282156Z

WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT  
INR MAY BE ABLE TO COMPILE FAIRLY DEFINITIVE LIST FOR  
CONTRACT RESEARCH GROUP IF NECESSARY--OR PERHAPS GROUP  
ITSELF CAN DO NECESSARY RESEARCH.  
HILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~